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5.1  Introduction 
Henry Thornton left a spare account-best  described by the Latin 
phrase,  multum  in  parvo, much in little-of his thoughts about the 
British monetary system during the Napoleonic era. That spare account 
is an incredibly rich source both of the elements of monetary theory 
and of instruction on the proper conduct of monetary policy. Any one 
of a dozen different insights recorded in Thornton’s work could serve 
as the subject of this lecture. He understood: 
the fallacy of the real-bills doctrine, 
the distinction between the first-round and ultimate effects of  mon- 
the lag in effect of monetary change, 
the problem market participants faced in distinguishing relative from 
the distinction between internal and external gold drains, 
the factors influencing the foreign exchanges including the role of 
how to bring inflation under control, 
the relation of the Bank of England to other English banks, 
types of effects of monetary disturbances on interest rates, 
the distinction between the market rate and the natural rate of interest 
From this impressive list of  ideas, I have chosen as my  point  of 
departure what Henry Thornton had to say about nominal and real 
interest rates. I shall then turn to a review of  the behavior of market 
interest rates in Britain in the century from  1874 to 1975, with some 
reference also to the differences between the British  and American 
etary change, 
general price changes, 
purchasing power parity, 
and between nominal and real rates of interest. 
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record.  The historical  material  is drawn from a study, now nearing 
completion, of monetary trends in the United States and the United 
Kingdom,  on  which  I  have  collaborated  with  Professor  Milton 
Friedman. 
Henry  Thornton  was  among the first to call attention  to the dis- 
tinction between the nominal and real rate of  interest. He explained 
the difference by the anticipated rate of inflation. On this view, when 
inflation comes to be anticipated, lenders demand and borrowers are 
willing to pay higher interest rates  to compensate for the expected 
decline in the purchasing power of the principal of and interest on the 
loan. The nominal interest rate is then a sum of the real rate of interest 
and  the  expected percentage change  in  the  price  level.  The  Usury 
Laws  in  force when  Thornton  lived  made  the  permitted  maximum 
interest rate in Britain 5%. To  describe the price anticipations effect 
on interest rates, Thornton had to cite a case other than an English 
one. He wrote: 
Accordingly,  in  countries  in  which  the  currency was  in  a rapid 
course of  depreciation,  supposing that there were no usury laws, 
the  current  rate  of  interest  was  often  . . . proportionably  aug- 
mented. Thus, for example, at Petersburgh, at this time [1811], the 
current interest was 20  or 25  per cent, which he conceived  to be 
partly  compensation for an expected increase of  the depreciation 
of the currency. 
Much later in the nineteenth century, Irving Fisher expressed  the 
same idea, which he subsequently elaborated in mathematical form. 
The question I propose to examine is the extent to which Thornton’s 
and later Irving Fisher’s views are confirmed by the empirical behavior 
of interest rates in Britain during the century from 1874 to 1975. I shall 
first report on the behavior of average nominal yields on three cate- 
gories of assets: short-term nominal assets, long-term nominal assets, 
and physical assets, specifically, the short-term rate on three-month 
bankers’ bills; the long-term rate on consols; and a proxy yield  on 
physical assets, namely, the rate of change of nominal income. I shall 
then discuss the behavior of average real yields on these categories of 
assets. Finally, I shall discuss the relation between nominal interest 
rates and the rate of price change. 
In the study from which this evidence is drawn, we express the data 
as an average over a business expansion from cyclical trough to cy- 
clical peak or a business contraction from cyclical peak to cyclical 
trough, sometimes referred to as half-cycles. In all, there are thirty- 
five such half-cycles for Britain during the period we cover.  I shall 
also report the averages over peacetime half-cycles and over various 
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5.2  Average Nominal Yields 
Over the century the several average nominal yields display a relation 
consistent with expectations. The short-term yield averaged 3.5%,  the 
long-term yield  4.2%, the  difference  of  77 basis  points presumably 
reflecting a liquidity premium which studies of the term structure of 
interest rates have shown to exist. 
The proxy for the nominal yield on physical assets is nearly identical 
with the nominal yield on long-term assets, as if arbitrage operated to 
equate the yields over the century. The equality does not, however, 
hold for subperiods,  and the difference between  nominal yields on 
nominal assets and on physical assets turns out to be a sensitive index 
of economic conditions. 
A comparison of nominal yields in the United States with those in 
Britain over the period as a whole shows US yields to be about one- 
half of one percentage point higher. However, the yields for the two 
countries are not directly comparable because of  changes in the ex- 
change rate. The price of the pound in dollars at the end of our period 
was lower than at the beginning, the rate of decline averaging 0.9% per 
year. Hence, a hypothetical long-lived Englishman who had purchased 
US assets at the beginning of  the period, held them throughout the 
period, and converted them back to pounds at the end of the period 
would have  earned  in  pounds 0.9 percentage points  more  than  the 
nominal US yields. Alternatively, an American who did the same with 
British assets would have earned in dollars 0.9 percentage points less 
the nominal British yields. The difference between the yields in the 
two countries in comparable terms is therefore roughly 1.4 percentage 
points rather than one-half of one percentage point. This difference is 
consistent with the net outflow of capital from Britain to the United 
States for much of the period, offset not by a private return flow induced 
by  interest  rate differentials  but by  UK government repatriation  of 
capital during World Wars I and 11. 
5.3  Ex-Post Real Yields 
We  calculate the ex-post real yield by subtracting the rate of change 
of prices from the nominal yield for all three categories of assets. Henry 
Thornton’s description of  the relationship  between nominal and ex- 
post real yields is apt: 
. . . if, for example, a man borrowed of the Bank flOOO in 1800, and 
paid it back in 1810, having obtained it by means of successive loans 
through that period, he paid back that which had become worth less 
by 20 or 30 per cent than it was worth when he first received it. He 
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money; but if from this interest were deducted the f20 or 230 per 
annum, which he had gained by the fall in the value of money, he 
would find that he had borrowed at 2 or 3 per cent, and not at 5 per 
cent, as he appeared to do. 
The relation among the ex-post real yields on our three categories 
of assets over the century we cover is the same as the relation among 
the nominal yields. However, as between the United States and Britain, 
the real yields are directly comparable. No further adjustment for ex- 
change rate changes is required because all yields  are, as it were, 
expressed in the prices, and hence exchange rate, of a given base date, 
in this study, 1929. 
The real yield, that is the excess of the nominal yield over the average 
rate of  inflation, averaged  about  1i%  for Britain, about  3%  for the 
United States. The reason the US yield exceeded the UK yield more 
for real than for nominal yields is that British prices rose on the average 
more rapidly than American prices, a difference that was reflected in 
the average behavior of the exchange rate. 
5.4  Yields in Peace-Time Cyclical Phases 
When war-time phases are excluded from the averages, it is no longer 
true that the proxy measure of the yield on physical assets approximates 
the yield on long-term nominal assets. It is decidedly lower than yields 
on either short- or long-term nominal assets. The excluded war-time 
phases are inflationary phases, when yields on physical assets have 
tended to be higher than yields on nominal assets. In addition, gov- 
ernmental policy of holding down interest rates on nominal assets in 
World War I1 also contributed to the change in the differential return 
on nominal and physical assets in war and nonwar phases. 
The assets that differ most in real yields between peace-time and all 
phases, however, are nominal, not physical, assets. The proxy for the 
nominal return on physical assets is higher for all phases than for peace- 
time phases by only a trifle less than the differential rate of inflation, 
so that the real return on physical assets is only slightly lower for all 
phases than for peace-time phases only. By contrast, the nominal return 
on nominal assets is about the same for all phases as for peace-time 
phases, so that the real return is appreciably less for all phases. The 
war-time periods highlight a point to which I shall revert in discussing 
other periods, namely yields on nominal assets for the most part behave 
as if price changes were unanticipated. 
We  distinguish between nominal yields on nominal assets and nom- 
inal yields on physical assets. There is no comparable explicit distinc- 
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implicitly. The man who borrowed flOOO in  1800 used the proceeds, 
he tells us,  “by  investing his money either in land or in successive 
commercial undertakings . . . and then finally selling his land or his 
commodities in the year 1810.” At the sale, the man “would find the 
produce amount[ed] to &200 or &300  above the &lo00  which he had 
borrowed,”  that is by the extent of the price rise over the decade, as 
estimated by Thornton. 
The point of the distinction is that nominal yields on nominal assets 
are contracted in advance, reflecting anticipated price changes, but not 
unanticipated price changes. The borrower of the flOOO knew in ad- 
vance that he would have to pay f50 a year in interest. The ex-post 
real yield on the loan reflected in full the unanticipated price change. 
The real yield on the El000 loan made at 5%  was only 2 or 3% because 
of unanticipated inflation. 
For physical assets, on the other hand, neither the nominal nor the 
real yield, as measured, is contracted in advance. The investor in land 
or in  successive commercial undertakings did not know in  advance 
what either the nominal or real yield would be at the time of sale. What 
is clear from Thornton’s example is the reflection in the sale price of 
the estimated rate of price rise in Britain from 1800 to 1810. There is, 
as it were, a measure of automatic indexing of yields on physical assets. 
Reflecting this difference in the characteristics of nominal assets and 
physical assets, nominal yields on nominal assets are consistently less 
variable than the real yields on nominal assets, whereas the reverse is 
true for yields on physical assets. The real yield on physical assets 
tends to be less variable than the nominal yield. 
5.5  Yields during Sub-Periods 
We  subdivide the century we cover into sub-periods, by separating 
the pre-World  War I period into the period before  1896, when prices 
were generally falling, and the subsequent period, when prices were 
generally rising, separating out the war periods, and treating the in- 
terwar period as one unit, because of the paucity of phase observations, 
even though the behavior of prices varied greatly during the nearly two 
decades covered. On the average, however, the interwar period was 
certainly a period  of falling prices.  The postwar period  requires no 
subdivision. It clearly is a period of  generally rising prices. 
We therefore have two periods of generally falling prices (before 1896, 
and interwar), two war-time periods of rising prices, and two peace- 
time periods of rising prices (1896-1914,  post-World  War 11). Using 
the division into periods, we can supplement the conclusions for the 
period as a whole with respect to, first, the differences between Britain 
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differential between the yields on nominal and on physical assets. We 
confine the comparisons for the subperiods to the short rate and the 
proxy yield on physical assets, omitting long rates. 
5.6  US-UK  Differential Yields 
If the differential of  the short rate as between the United States and 
Britain is examined over the six subperiods, it shows a steady decline 
from period to period, with a particularly sharp decline from the pre- 
1896 to the 1896 to World War I period. In the pre-1896 period, the 
short rate was 2.5 percentage points higher in the United States than 
in  Britain.  In the post-World  War  I1 period, the short rate was  1.5 
percentage points lower in the United States than in Britain. 
Different factors played a role in different sub-periods in contributing 
to the decline in the differential yield. The most interesting episode in 
the decline of the differential occurred in the pre-1896 period, when 
the differential averaged one percentage point higher than in the sub- 
sequent period to World War I. A substantial increase in the degree of 
financial sophistication in the United States relative to that in Britain 
as between the two pre-World  War I periods could have produced a 
decline in the market rate of interest on nominal assets like commercial 
paper  that was  traded  in  active  US financial markets.  However,  a 
detailed examination of the US-UK  differential year by year contra- 
dicts this interpretation. There was no gradual reduction in the differ- 
ential such as might be expected from a gradual growth in financial 
sophistication. The differential rather shows an abrupt drop from one 
level from 1874 though 1896, to another level from 1897 to 1914, with 
sizable year-to-year fluctuations about those levels. The extreme values 
for  1893 and  1896 suggest an explanation for the drop in level. The 
extreme value in  1893 reflects the banking panic of that year in the 
United States, which led after July to a restriction of  cash payments 
by banks and to a market premium on currency, which was equivalent 
to a depreciation of the US dollar vis-a-vis the British pound. The 1896 
extreme value of the US-UK  differential reflects the capital flight of 
that year produced by William Jennings Bryan’s nomination for pres- 
ident, exacerbating fears that the United  States would abandon the 
gold standard. In both cases, fear of devaluation was a deterrent to the 
flow of British short-term capital to the US market except at a sub- 
stantial premium. The election of William McKinley in 1896 changed 
the outlook. It made US adherence to the gold standard secure for the 
time being and the subsequent flood of gold from South Africa, Alaska, 
and Colorado removed all doubts. 
The fear that the United  States would abandon the gold standard 
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rate than Britain or deflate at a slower rate. The fear of inflation also 
animated the opponents of free silver, the endemic political issue of 
the pre-1896 period. The paradoxical effect was to produce deflation- 
or more rapid deflation than would otherwise have occurred. The par- 
adox shows up to the full in interest rates. Before 1896, US prices were 
falling at a 1 percentage point per year faster rate than in Britain. That 
alone should have produced an appreciation of the US dollar by 1%  a 
year and a 1 percentage point lower interest rate. But the fear of inflation 
more than countered the fact of deflation; kept the currency in danger 
of being devalued; and made interest rates in the United States 1 per- 
centage point higher relative to those in Britain than they were after 
the fear was resolved. 
The contrast between fact and belief  continued  after  1896. In the 
subsequent eighteen years, prices rose in the United States by some- 
thing over 1  percentage point more per year than in Britain. The fact 
of inflation by itself should have produced a depreciation of the US 
dollar and a 1 percentage point higher interest rate in the United States. 
But the altered attitudes and the elimination of the silver issue meant 
that the exchange value of the dollar was never threatened  and US 
interest rates, while higher than in Britain, were  1  percentage point 
less so than they were before 1896. The facts would have justified a 2 
percentage point rise in the differential US-UK  rate on nominal assets 
from before to after  1896. The beliefs about inflation produced  a  1 
percentage point decline! 
There was a further 1 percentage point decline in the differential on 
nominal assets in the United States over that in Britain from the average 
of the two preWorld War I periods to the interwar period. That decline 
is matched by a decline of  1  percentage point in the differential real 
yield on physical assets over the corresponding period, which may be 
regarded as largely accounting for the decline in the differential on 
nominal assets. 
The final decline of 2 percentage points in the US-UK  differential 
from the interwar to the postwar period corresponds to the 2.4 per- 
centage point decline  in  the rate of  price rise in  the United  States 
relative to that in Britain. This differential rate of price decline was 
reflected in the depreciation of the British pound relative to the US 
dollar. 
To summarize: the decline in the US-UK  differential for the nominal 
short rate from before to after 1896 reflects the resolution of fears that 
the United States would inflate and the US dollar would be devalued; 
the further decline from pre-World  War I to the interwar period reflects 
a decline in the real yield on physical capital in the United States relative 
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the post-World  War I1 period reflects greater inflation in Britain than 
in the United States and an accompanying depreciation of the pound. 
5.7  Differential Yields on Nominal vs. Physical Assets 
If in each subperiod arbitrage had worked as well as it did for the 
period as a whole, the yields on nominal and physical assets would be 
equal or differ by a constant reflecting the average preference for phys- 
ical versus nominal assets or the reverse. For peace-time periods, how- 
ever, as I indicated earlier, the equality did not hold, so arbitrage clearly 
did not work as well in each subperiod as in the period as a whole. 
In the two periods of falling prices, the yield on nominal assets was 
decidedly higher for both countries than our proxy for the yield on 
physical assets. Deflation was not anticipated. Lenders did well. Bor- 
rowers did poorly. Since in the main, entrepreneurs borrow in nominal 
terms to acquire physical assets, rentiers did well, entrepreneurs badly, 
which would seem to support the widely believed generalization that 
a period of unanticipated deflation is adverse to enterprise and growth. 
That generalization is belied, however, for the pre-1896 period of falling 
prices in both Britain and the United States, since real output grew at 
the rate of 2.2% and 3.3% per year in each country, respectively. 
With the exception of  Britain  from  1897 to World  War I, during 
periods of inflation our proxy for the yield on physical assets was higher 
than  the  yield  on nominal assets. Apparently  inflation too was  not 
anticipated. Entrepreneurs did well, rentiers did poorly; capital was 
transferred from savers to borrowers, which would seem to support 
the widely believed generalization  that unanticipated  inflation is fa- 
vorable to enterprise and growth. Yet that generalization is also belied 
for the 1897-World  War I period of rising prices in both Britain and 
the United States, since real growth was greater during the pre-1896 
period of falling prices than during the post-1896 period of rising prices. 
But the public perception at the time was clearly the reverse. Alfred 
Marshall referred to this phenomenon in 1886, when he wrote, “I think 
there is much less difference than is generally supposed between the 
net benefits of  rising and falling prices.” 
Henry Thornton was aware that holders of physical assets appeared 
to do better than holders of  nominal assets during an inflation. He 
observed: 
It was true, that men did not generally perceive, that, during a fall 
in the price of money [the value of money], they borrowed at this 
advantageous rate of interest; they felt, however, the advantage of 
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as he believed, in the following manner: . . . they balanced their 
books once a year, and, on estimating  the value of those commodities 
in which they had invested their borrowed money, they found that 
value to be continually increasing, so that there was an apparent 
profit over and above the natural and ordinary profit on mercantile 
transactions. 
One way to examine the effect of the rate of  price change on the 
difference between  the yields on nominal and physical assets is to 
array the subperiods by the rate of  price change, disregarding both 
chronology and country. If  the price change had  been fully antici- 
pated, and the real yield  had  been independent of  the rate of  price 
change, the nominal yields on nominal assets would rise as the rate 
of  price  change  increased,  and  the  real  yields  on  physical  assets 
would stay constant. In fact, the nominal yields fluctuated about a 
roughly constant level, so that the effect of  inflation produced a sharp 
decline in the real yield on nominal assets as the rate of price change 
increased. The hypothetical pattern of  yields for a fully anticipated 
inflation came close to being realized for physical assets. Their nom- 
inal yield  rose with inflation and  their real yield  fluctuated about a 
more or less constant level. However, this pattern does not reflect 
anticipations so much  as the  physical character  of  the  assets and 
their real yields. 
For nominal assets, investors fix rates in nominal terms and contract 
for a period ahead; prescience is therefore required if  these rates are 
to reflect future price behavior. For physical assets, investors may fix 
no rates, and certainly not in nominal terms, and generally make no 
contracts about either real or nominal yields for a period ahead. The 
yield is generated out of  the economic activity in which the asset is 
employed. It requires no prescience for the nominal yield on physical 
assets to reflect current price behavior, only that the physical asset 
participate along with other assets in the nominal income and spending 
flows. 
The excess of the yield on physical assets over that on nominal assets 
is sharply negative for deflation, sharply positive for inflation. If infla- 
tions were fully anticipated, the differences between yields on physical 
and nominal assets might be expected to be roughly a constant, re- 
flecting any preference among asset holders for one category or other 
of  assets. For peacetime periods, there is no indication of  such con- 
stancy. If inflation were wholly unanticipated, and there were no pref- 
erence for one or the other category of  assets, ex-post, the nominal 
yield on physical assets would reflect the actual rate of inflation, whereas 
the ex-ante nominal yield on nominal assets would not. This seems to 
describe the facts, with some indication that there was a 1 percentage 
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to accept that much less in yield in order to hold a physical rather than 
a nominal asset. 
This description of the pattern that would be produced by wholly 
unanticipated inflations does not apply accurately to both US war-time 
episodes and especially World War I for Britain. There appears to be 
rough constancy in these three episodes in the excess of the yield on 
physical assets over that on nominal assets, as if  they corresponded 
to anticipated inflations. But interpreting these episodes in this way 
implies a very great preference-about  8 percentage points-for  nom- 
inal assets during war-time periods over physical assets-which  seems 
most implausible.  Possibly the war-time estimates are an aberration 
rather than an indication of correct anticipation of war-time inflation. 
These results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the ex-ante 
nominal yields on nominal assets incorporate correctly anticipated rates 
of inflation-which  merely confirms what has long been known, that 
the public has not in fact been able over long periods, at least, until 
possibly very recently, to make correct anticipations of inflation. We 
can, however, examine the observations within the subperiods to de- 
termine whether there is evidence of a gradual recognition of and ad- 
justment to inflation or deflation. 
5.8  Relations between Yields on Nominal and Physical Assets 
Our proxy for the real return on physical assets varied  in the six 
subperiods, ranging for Britain from -  2.6 to +  2.2% per year, but the 
variation was far less than for the ex-post real yield on nominal assets, 
which ranged from -  10.8 to +4.8%  per year. Moreover, one extreme 
item accounts for most of the British range for our proxy for the real 
return on physical assets. Omitting World War I leaves five observa- 
tions, ranging from  1.3 to 2.2% per  year.  No remotely comparable 
reduction in the range can be achieved for the real yield on nominal 
assets by omitting the most discrepant observation. 
We  can adopt Irving Fisher’s view that the ex-post real return on 
physical assets can be taken to be roughly constant on the average 
over time-though  at a higher level in the United States than in Britain. 
Then the wide variation among subperiods in the difference between 
the returns on nominal and physical assets reflects primarily the failure 
of nominal  yields  on nominal assets to adjust to the actual rate of 
inflation. As a result, ex-post real returns on nominal assets vary widely. 
The implication of rough constancy of real returns on physical assets 
is that the variation in ex-post real returns on nominal assets reflects 
primarily unanticipated changes in inflation. 
In Irving Fisher’s analysis, nominal yields adjust not to the actual 
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adjusts to actual  inflation after a considerable  lag.  In line with  his 
analysis, we would expect to find that, shortly after a change from, 
say, falling to rising prices, the yield on physical assets would exceed 
substantially the yield on nominal assets, reflecting the incorporation 
in the yield  on nominal  assets of the lagged anticipations of falling 
prices. As prices continued to rise, the differential would decline and 
approach the equilibrium difference, reflecting (inversely) any general 
preference for physical over nominal assets (or conversely). 
For the pre-World  War I period, there is evidence of a response by 
nominal yields to price anticipations. During the pre-1896 period of 
falling prices, the nominal short-term yield fell as if it were adjusting 
to anticipations of  deflation.  During the subsequent period of  rising 
prices, the nominal  short-term yield rose as if  it were adjusting to 
anticipations of inflation. This pattern is not visible in the US data. 
Since the British financial market before 1914 was more sophisticated 
than the US market, it is not implausible that yields were more re- 
sponsive to anticipations of price change in Britain. 
The only other  subperiod that  shows evidence  of  a response by 
nominal yields to price anticipations is the post-World  War I1 period. 
The nominal short-term yield rises steadily throughout the period; the 
ex-posf real yield on nominal assets rises sharply in the early part of 
the period and then fluctuates about a more or less constant trend; and 
our proxy for the real yield on physical assets shows no steady trend. 
5.9  Nominal Yields and Rates of Change of Prices 
These results led us to examine more closely the relation between 
nominal yields on short-term nominal assets and the rate of change of 
prices. A chart reveals an apparent connection for two widely separated 
periods: the period before World War I, and the period after 1970. 
One feature of the relationship is the much wider variability of price 
change than of  the rate of interest. This may reflect greater measure- 
ment error in the series on price change than in the series on interest 
rates, but a more plausible explanation is economic: the wider variation 
in prices reflects the existence of monetary and other disturbances that 
were random and could not be readily anticipated.  In the relatively 
stable decades before World War I, in Britain, it was possible to  identify 
the tides through the much smaller waves; in the post-1970 decade, 
variability was great, but attributable to policy, not change. 
If the short-term rate and the rate of price change are correlated for 
phases of our individual sub-periods, the only significant correlation is 
for the post-World  War I1 period. The indication that there may have 
been a change in the relation  between interest rates and the rate of 
change of prices in the 1970s made it desirable to exploit data for shorter 
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averages of the rate of change-averaged  over six-month intervals to 
reduce extreme variability-of the cost-of-living index, which the retail 
price index superseded in 1956, against the monthly three-month bank- 
ers’ bill series. There is evident a lack of  any short-term systematic 
relation between interest rates and the recorded rate of price change, 
and much wider short-period fluctuations in price change than in in- 
terest rates. There is a drastic reduction in the variability of recorded 
price change in Britain after the mid-1950s, presumably reflecting the 
comprehensive statistical revision of  the price index in  1956. It may 
well be that a large part of the recorded fluctuations in prices before 
this date consisted of measurement error. Hence, the possibility cannot 
be ruled out that the statistical noise in the recorded price series drowns 
out a systematic relation between interest rates and the “true”  rate of 
price change. 
The UK monthly results from 1956 to the early  1970s rather argue 
against this conclusion. Despite the lesser amplitude of price fluctua- 
tions, this period, like earlier periods,  shows essentially  no relation 
between the rate on three-month bankers’ bills and the rate of price 
change. 
The monthly figures also reveal that the rate on three-month bankers’ 
bills was often sticky, calling into question the extent to which the rate 
was truly market determined. The problem is by no means limited to 
the commercial bill market. Other short-term rates are also sticky. With 
the introduction of Competition and Credit Control in May 1971, the 
three-month bankers’ bill rate for some years exhibited a reduction in 
rigidity. In the past few years, that is less evident. 
One further feature of the relation deserves mention. The current 
rate on three-month bankers’ bills since 1965 has been  more highly 
correlated with the six-month price change average six months in the 
future than with the current six-month average. Interest rates appar- 
ently are forecasting price change over the next half year. This would 
suggest that lenders and borrowers have become better able to protect 
themselves against price changes than they were earlier in the postwar 
period. 
The explanation may be that market participants have belatedly rec- 
ognized the drastic change in the character of  the monetary  system 
from a largely specie standard to a fiduciary standard.  The change 
altered the information relevant to predicting the future course of prices. 
There is less short-term but more long-term variability in rates of in- 
flation and much higher levels of inflation than had been experienced 
in peace-time over the past century. As a result, market participants 
have a greater incentive to seek to allow for future price movements. 
In Britain, the indication that interest rates and price change move 
symmetrically has lasted for a brief  period only. The apparent shift 
may prove temporary. Whether it does, or whether it is carried farther, 164  Anna J. Schwartz 
may well depend on whether future rates of inflation remain as high 
and as variable as  in the past decade (or even higher and more variable) 
or whether rates of inflation return to earlier peacetime levels. 
5.10  Conclusion 
Two themes of this lecture-the  relation between yields on nominal 
and on physical assets, and the relation between rates of  change of 
prices and interest rates in  Britain over the past century-examine 
empirically an idea that Henry Thornton presented in his speech on 7 
May  181  1, in the debate in the House of Commons on the Report of 
the Bullion Committee. He observed that nominal interest rates were 
relatively high when prices were rising because lenders and borrowers 
anticipated price movements and allowed for them in the interest rates 
they charged or paid. 
The empirical evidence suggests that for much of the past century 
an effect in this direction has been very much damped. In recent years, 
however, nominal interest rates have begun to track the rate of price 
change more closely than at any earlier time in the century from 1874. 
Nominal rates of interest have become more variable than real rates 
of interest, as Irving Fisher believed them to be, and nominal returns 
on nominal assets have become as variable as nominal returns on phys- 
ical assets. The shift to a fiduciary monetary standard in the postwar 
period  and the increased long-term variability of  prices that  ensued 
have driven lenders and borrowers to seek to predict price changes 
more  accurately, and to adjust the terms  of lending and borrowing 
accordingly. 